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It has been shown that human combination of crossmodal information is highly consistent with an optimal Bayesian model
performing causal inference. These ﬁndings have shed light on the computational principles governing crossmodal
integration/segregation. Intuitively, in a Bayesian framework priors represent a priori information about the environment, i.e.,
information available prior to encountering the given stimuli, and are thus not dependent on the current stimuli. While this
interpretation is considered as a deﬁning characteristic of Bayesian computation by many, the Bayes rule per se does not
require that priors remain constant despite signiﬁcant changes in the stimulus, and therefore, the demonstration of
Bayes-optimality of a task does not imply the invariance of priors to varying likelihoods. This issue has not been addressed
before, but here we empirically investigated the independence of the priors from the likelihoods by strongly manipulating the
presumed likelihoods (by using two drastically different sets of stimuli) and examining whether the estimated priors change
or remain the same. The results suggest that the estimated prior probabilities are indeed independent of the immediate
input and hence, likelihood.
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Introduction
Bayesian inference is a statistically optimal way of
combining information sources about a hidden property
given noisy/uncertain environment and sensory represen-
tations. A number of studies have examined whether
human multisensory information integration follows the
rules specified by Bayes law. Generally, the evidence
indicates that it does (Alais & Burr, 2004; Battaglia,
Jacobs, & Aslin, 2003; Beierholm, Kording, Shams, &
Ma, 2008; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Ghahramani, 1995;
Ko¨rding et al., 2007; Shams, Ma, & Beierholm, 2005; van
Beers, Sittig, & Gon, 1999). Similar studies have been
performed on cues within modalities (e.g. texture and
motion, Jacobs, 1999) or stereo and shading (Bu¨lthoff &
Mallot, 1988), all demonstrating a close consistency
between human perception and Bayesian inference.
Furthermore, recent studies have shown that human
multisensory perception, not confined to integration but
spanning the entire range from integration to segregation,
is remarkably consistent with a Bayesian observer
performing causal inference (Ko¨rding et al., 2007, see
also Bresciani, Dammeier, & Ernst, 2006; Roach, Heron,
& McGraw, 2006; Shams et al., 2005). Together, these
results suggest that human multisensory perception is
Bayes-optimal.
In a Bayesian framework, perceptual decisions are
based upon the posterior probability distribution, which
is obtained by combining the likelihood distributions (of
for example, visual stimulus 3) and prior distributions:
Posterior(3)ò Likelihood(3) * Priors. Demonstrating that
a task is performed in a fashion consistent with Bayesian
inference in one stimulus regime (e.g., 31) does not
necessarily predict that the priors used under that stimulus
regime would be the same as those under a different
stimulus regime (e.g., 32):
Posteriorð31Þ ò Likelihoodð31Þ*Prior1
Posteriorð32Þ ò Likelihoodð32Þ*Prior2: ð1Þ
While the Prior probability in the Bayes rule has been
interpreted as a probability distribution that reflects the
statistics of the environment and hence, is stable and
invariant to sensory conditions, this is not necessitated by
the Bayes rule per se. Previously testing these questions
have not been possible due to a lack of theoretical
framework for fitting the priors, but which is now available
(Ko¨rding et al., 2007). Here, we empirically tested whether
priors are indeed stable in the face of substantial changes
in the sensory conditions (see Equation 1). If we find that
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subjects generate their posteriors under two different
conditions (e.g. difference in visual contrast 3) according
to Equation 1, then the likelihoods are expected to be
different (i.e., Likelihood(31) m Likelihood(32)). On the
other hand, the priors may or may not be different
between the two conditions. The priors would only be
the same (i.e., Prior1 = Prior2) if indeed they are
independent of likelihoods.
To test this, we used an auditory-visual spatial local-
ization task in which human performance was recently
shown to be Bayes-optimal (Ko¨rding et al., 2007).
Subjects were presented with visual stimulus as well as
auditory stimulus and asked to report the perceived
location of both stimuli. We tested each participant in
two sessions one week apart. The two sessions were
identical except for the contrast of the visual stimulus. The
Bayesian model predicts a difference in the likelihood
functions of the observers due to the contrast differ-
enceVwhich would in turn be reflected in a difference in
posteriors and response. Considering that in our model the
priors are estimated from observer responses, and that the
observer responses are drastically different in the two
sessions (due to the large change in visual contrast), it
cannot be necessarily expected that the priors estimated
from the two sessions would be equal. Therefore, finding
equal priors in the two sessions would provide strong
support for the proposition that the priors are encoded
independently from the likelihoods.
We used spatial localization as the task for this study.
Two features make this task of particular interest. First, it
is a task in which the nervous system is implicitly engaged
regularly in daily life. Although not always conscious of
it, we constantly have to estimate the position of objects in
order to navigate and interact with our environment and it
is therefore a task which we expect to be optimized by
evolution. Second, in some conditions there is a strong
and well-known spatial localization illusion, the ventrilo-
quist illusion, which illustrates the strong interactions
between visual and auditory modalities in estimating the
spatial location of objects. We presented observers with
auditory and visual stimuli at variable locations and asked
them to report their perceived locations of both visual and
auditory stimuli. We scheduled the two sessions one week
apart so that if there is any modulation of priors due to
exposure to the first session, the effect would wear off by
the time of the second session through exposure to the
natural environment. Furthermore, a general assumption
about priors is that they represent the statistics of the
environment learned over the course of life or evolution,
and are therefore, expected to be stable over time.
For each of the two sessions, we fitted the parameters of
the likelihood and priors to the data and then compared
the estimated likelihoods and priors between the two
conditions. Part of the experimental data that we analyze
here (for high contrast condition) has been reported
previously (Ko¨rding et al., 2007).
Methods
Stimuli
Visual and auditory stimuli were presented independ-
ently at one of five positions. The five locations extended
along a horizontal line 5- below the fixation point, from
10- to the left of the fixation point to 10- to the right of the
fixation point, at 5- intervals. Visual stimuli were 35 ms
presentations of Gabor wavelets extending 2- on a
background of visual noise. The visual contrast was
adjusted on an individual basis so that subjects’ unimodal
performance was 90% correct for the high contrast session
and 40% correct for the low contrast session. Auditory
stimuli were presented through a pair of headphones
(Sennheiser HD280) and consisted of 35 ms white noise.
The auditory stimuli were filtered through a Head Related
Transfer Function (HRTF), gathered individually from
subjects using a pair of in-ear microphones (Sound
Professionals) using procedures similar to those described
by http://sound.media.mit.edu/KEMAR.html, and simu-
lated sounds originating from the five spatial locations in
the frontoparallel plane where the visual stimuli were
presented. In bimodal conditions, the auditory and visual
stimuli were synchronized.
Procedure
Each observer participated in two sessions. The two
sessions were identical in every way except for the
contrast of the visual stimulus. In the first session the
visual stimulus was high contrast and in the second
session it was low-contrast. The second session was one
week after the first session. Observers’ task was to report
the location of the visual stimulus as well as the location
of the sound in each trial using the keyboard. The order of
the auditory and visual reports was fixed within the
experiment for each subject but was counterbalanced
across subjects. Auditory and visual stimuli were pre-
sented alone or simultaneously, leading to a total of 35
conditions (see Figure 1). The experiment consisted of 15
trials of each condition, amounting to a total of 525 trials,
ordered pseudo-randomly. Twenty naive observers
(undergraduate and graduate students at Caltech, 18 to
35 years old, eleven male) participated in the experiment.
The data for one participant was discarded since sub-
sequent analysis showed that the auditory responses of the
subject were at chance. Subjects were seated at a viewing
distance of 54 cm from a 21-inch CRT monitor. A fixation
cross was always present 5- above the level of stimuli, but
its color turned from red to white 0.5 second before the
start of the trial, and then remained that color throughout
the trial. Participants were encouraged to take breaks
every 10 minutes.
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Model
We use the same model as that described in Ko¨rding
et al. (2007). Figure 2 shows the statistical structure of the
Bayesian observer model. The most important feature of
this model is that it does not assume integration a priori.
Instead it assumes that the sensory signals xV and xA are
caused by either a single source s (Figure 2 left) or by two
separate sources, sA and sV (Figure 2 right). xV and xA
represent the visual and auditory signals, respectively, and
are assumed to be conditionally independent, based on the
observation that the auditory and visual signals are
processed in separate pathways and are likely corrupted
by independent noise.
Presented with the signals xV and xA the Bayesian
observer therefore has to estimate whether the two signals
originate from a common cause (C = 1) or from two
separate causes (C = 2). How likely each scenario is
depends on how similar the auditory and visual sensations
(xV and xA) are. According to Bayes’ rule, the probability
of there being a single cause is:
p C ¼ 1kxV; xAð Þ ¼ pðxV; xAkC ¼ 1Þpc
pðxV ; xAkC ¼ 1Þpc þ pðxV ; xAkC ¼ 2Þð1jpcÞ;
ð2Þ
where pc= denotes the prior probability of a single cause in
the environment and p(xV, xA|C = 1) and p(xV, xA|C = 2)
can be found by marginalizing over sA and sV (see
Ko¨rding et al., 2007). Given this knowledge, the optimal
solution for the location that minimizes the mean expected
squared error is:
s^V ¼ pðC ¼ 1kxV ; xAÞs^C¼1
þ ð1j pðC ¼ 1kxV ; xAÞÞs^V;C¼2; ð3Þ
s^A ¼ pðC ¼ 1kxV ; xAÞs^C¼1
þ ð1j pðC ¼ 1kxV ; xAÞÞs^A;C¼2;
ð4Þ
Figure 1. a) The experimental paradigm. Subjects were presented with either unimodal audio, unimodal visual or bimodal audio-visual
stimuli. b) The inﬂuence of vision on the perceived position of an auditory stimulus in the central location is shown. Different colors
correspond to the visual stimulus at different locations (sketched in warm to cold colors from the left to the right). The unimodal auditory
case is shown in gray.
Figure 2. The Causal Inference model. The model assumes that
each auditory and visual signal can be due to either one common
cause (C = 1) or two independent causes (C = 2). Given the
sensory signals xV and xA the brain has to infer which model is
more likely and base its estimate of the sources sV and sA on this.
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where s^VorA is the visual or audio response, s^C=1 is the
optimal estimate if we were certain that there is a single
cause, and s^V,C=2, s^A,C=2 are visual and auditory uni-modal
estimates, respectively, if we were certain that the two
stimuli are independent (two causes). We assume that the
unimodal likelihoods, p(xV|sV), p(xA|sA), as well as the
prior probability distribution over locations (assuming
p(s) = p(sV) = p(sA)), are normally distributed with means
and variances (2A, AA
2), (2V, AV
2), and (2P, AP
2), respectively.
Thus:
s^V;C¼1 ¼ s^A;C¼1 ¼
xV
A2V
þ xA
A2A
þ 2P
A2P
1
A2V
þ 1
A2A
þ 1
A2P
; ð5Þ
and
s^V;C¼2 ¼
xV
A2V
þ 2P
A2P
1
A2V
þ 1
A2P
; s^A;C¼2 ¼
xA
A2A
þ 2P
A2P
1
A2A
þ 1
A2P
: ð6Þ
C is binomially distributed with P(C = 1) = pC We
assume that the mean of the likelihoods are at the
veridical locations and that mean of the prior distribution
over locations is at the fixation point, 0 deg. In order to
relate the theoretical posterior with the subjects’ responses
we assume that subjects try to limit their mean deviation
and therefore report the mean of their posterior. The four
free parameters (AA, AV, AP, pC) were fitted to the
participants’ responses using 10000 trials of Monte Carlo
simulation and MATLAB’s fminsearch function (Math-
works, 2006), maximizing the likelihood of the parame-
ters of the model.
The posterior can be rewritten in a more familiar form
(Shams et al., 2005):
p sV ; sAkxV; xAð Þ ¼ pðxV ksVÞpðxAksAÞpðsV ; sAÞ
pðxV ; xAÞ ; ð7Þ
where
pðsV ; sAÞ ¼ pc%ðsVjsAÞpðsAÞ þ ð1jpcÞpðsVÞpðsAÞ: ð8Þ
This is a mixture model (see Ko¨rding et al., 2007 for
more details), mixing the prior from the two separate
causal structures in Figure 2 and is therefore very similar
to models developed for mixture problems for the visual
system (Knill, 2003, 2007; Landy, Maloney, Johnston, &
Young, 1995).
As in Ko¨rding et al. (2007) and Stocker and Simoncelli
(2006), we model the trial to trial variability in observer
responses as opposed to average behavior. We assume that
the variability in response for the same stimulus condition
from trial to trial is primarily due to the noise in
measurement (neuronal firing). Because of the variability
in measurement, the mean of likelihood function fluc-
tuates from trial to trial, but the variance is constant (here
it is assumed that the nervous system has an accurate
estimation of this variability). The average of the means of
the likelihood distribution is assumed to be at the veridical
position, i.e., no bias in measurement. The variability in
the likelihood function leads to variability in posterior and
the variability in the estimate (which is the mean of the
posterior) from trial to trial.
Results
Figure 1b shows the subjects’ auditory responses for
various visual stimulus locations, but fixed auditory
location. For visual stimuli presented to the left of the
auditory stimulus, the subjects’ responses naturally tend to
shift to the left, and similarly to the right for visual stimuli
presented to the right of the auditory response. The shift
tends to be larger for high visual contrast than low visual
contrast, as would be expected from any Bayesian model
of multisensory interaction (Alais & Burr, 2004; Ernst &
Banks, 2002; Ghahramani, 1995; Knill & Pouget, 2004;
Ko¨rding et al., 2007; Shams et al., 2005).
To test the predictions of the model we first fitted the
parameters of the causal inference model (Ko¨rding et al.,
2007) to the data. The response probabilities of a
representative human observer and the model for the high
contrast data set are shown in Figure 3, where each panel
corresponds to one stimulus condition. We calculated the
goodness of fit R2 over 300 data points (12 (s^A, s^V)
combinations at 25 bimodal conditions). The average
human observers’ performance (pooled across subjects) is
remarkably consistent with the Bayesian observer in the
high contrast session, yielding R2 = 0.97. The goodness of
fit is also good, however lower, for the low contrast
session, R2 = 0.75, due to the larger variability in the
visual data. The consistency of the human and Bayesian
observer indicates that human sensory cue combination/
segregation is Bayes-optimal. We have previously com-
pared the performance of several different models on this
task and found that the Causal Inference model performs
the best among these (Ko¨rding et al., 2007).
Independence of priors from likelihoods
We examined the effect of change in the visual stimulus
on the estimated likelihoods and priors. The likelihoods
p(xA|sA) and p(xV|sV) are functions of the input, whereas
the prior probabilities (pC and p(s)) are generally assumed
to be independent of the stimuli. Here we assume that the
possible change in priors due to exposure to the uniform
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distribution of stimuli in the first session is very small due
to the short duration of the session (40 minutes), and this
change, if any, decays after one week of exposure to
normal environment, leaving the priors in effect
unchanged. Given that the auditory stimulus was the same
between the two sessions, we expected the auditory
likelihood p(xA|sA) to be the same across the two sessions.
On the other hand, since the contrast of the visual stimulus
was very different between the two sessions, we expected
a noisier representation for the visual stimulus and thus, a
broader likelihood distribution p(xV|sV) in the low-contrast
session. A change in the stimulus supposedly has no
bearing on the prior knowledge about the environment,
and thus the parameters characterizing the priors (pC and
Ap) were expected to be the same between the two
sessions. Indeed, the change in visual stimulus contrast led
to considerable change in the visual performance; observ-
ers’ performance in the visual-alone conditions declined
on average by 40% in the low-contrast session. In contrast
the average auditory performance declined only 2% in the
low-contrast session.
We examined how the estimated likelihoods and priors
differed between the two sessions, using multiple meth-
ods. We compared the parameters that were optimized
separately for each session with each other to assess the
difference in various parameters. As expected, the width
of the visual likelihood is much larger (i.e., the precision
is lower) in the low-contrast condition than in the high-
contrast condition. As evidenced by the change in
performance, this is a substantial change in the standard
deviation of the likelihood distribution, from 2.12- to
11.71-. In contrast, the difference between the widths of
the auditory likelihoods in the two conditions is minute
(8.76- vs. 7.95-). This is consistent with the fact that the
auditory stimulus was identical between the two sessions.
These results confirm that these parameters indeed
represent the theoretical notion of likelihood function
and are not some arbitrary free parameters optimized to fit
the data.
Next, we examined the change in the two prior
parameters: the prior probability of a single cause and
the width of the prior distribution over space. The change
in these parameters is relatively small: pC changes from
0.24 to 0.25 and the spatial prior variance, Ap, changes
from 11.55- to 13.12-. If the priors are the same in both
sessions, using priors that are estimated from one data set
should work as well as using priors that are optimized on
the other data set. We tested this. Applying priors
optimized from the high contrast data set to account for
the low contrast data resulted in but a slight decrease in
goodness of fit (from R2 = 0.75 to R2 = 0.74). Similarly,
applying priors optimized from the low-contrast data to
account for the high-contrast data resulted in only a slight
decline in performance (from R2 = 0.97 to R2 = 0.95).
Therefore, using priors optimized from a different data set
caused hardly any decrease in goodness of fit.
These results suggest that the priors are approximately
the same between the two sessions. While the difference
between the prior parameters in two sessions is small,
there is nevertheless some difference, and this small
difference may reflect a meaningful effect. To examine
this possibility, we fitted the parameters for the data sets
Figure 3. The 35 experimental conditions for one subject for high contrast session. Rows indicate visual, columns auditory conditions.
Blue lines are the frequency of subject responses to the auditory stimuli, red lines indicate the frequency of visual responses to the visual
stimuli and the dotted lines indicate the corresponding model ﬁts.
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of individual participants (see Table 1) and for each
parameter, we compared the value for the two sessions
across participants using a two-tailed paired t-test (see
Figure 4). The only parameter that showed a statistically
significant difference between the two sessions is that
associated with the visual likelihood (visual standard
deviation, AV) (p G 0.0005). No other parameter had
significantly different values across the two sessions
(p 9 0.05). Equivalently, the probability of replication is
below 0.69 for each parameter except for AV (Prep 9 0.995,
z = 2.65).
We have here assumed that the mean of the priors is
fixed at 0- and that the mean of the likelihood is unbiased
for all subjects. However, removing these constraints (by
adding 2P, and a bias to the likelihoods, as free
parameters) does not change the results of the statistical
tests above. Furthermore, neither one of these parameters
undergoes a statistically significant change between the
two sessions and the distribution of both parameters is not
different (p 9 0.05) from the assumed values (i.e., zero for
prior, and the veridical location for the likelihoods) in
either session.
Altogether, these results suggest that, despite a large
difference in the visual likelihood, the priors are stable
across the two conditions It should be noted that here we
fail to reject the null hypothesis that the priors are equal
between the two session. As this failure could in principle
be due to an insufficient experimental power, we
performed a statistical power analysis for the paired t-tests.
The power to detect a low-mid size effect (a 0.5 standard
deviation shift in the distribution) is moderately good
(58%, 57% and 55% for AA, Ap, and pC, respectively). The
power to detect a relatively large effect size (1 standard
deviation) is excellent (99% for all three). Therefore, we
can be highly confident that the change in the stimuli did
not cause a large change in any of these three parameters,
and can be fairly confident that it did not cause a moderate
change. Therefore, the magnitude of difference would have
to be quite small, if any, not to be detected by these tests.
In light of the fact that the difference in visual likelihoods
Figure 4. Estimated parameter values. Bar plot showing the value of the mean value (T standard error) of the four different parameters
across subjects for the High contrast experiment (Blue) and Low contrast (Red) sessions separately. The only parameter that is
signiﬁcantly different between the two conditions was the standard deviation of visual likelihoods, AV, (p G 0.0005), no other parameter
was different between the two sessions (p 9 0.05).
Likelihoods Priors
Visual AV Auditory AA Location AP Common cause pC
High (group) 2.12- 8.76- 11.55- 0.24
Low (group) 11.71- 7.95- 13.12- 0.25
High (Indiv) 2.1 T 0.2- 9.2 T 1.1- 12.3 T 1.1- 0.28 T 0.05
Low (Indiv) 15.0 T 2.1- 9.4 T 1.6- 15.8 T 2.3- 0.24 T 0.05
Table 1. Comparison of values of different parameters. For the individual data ﬁtting we give mean T standard error.
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is quite substantial (more than 10 standard deviations),
such a putatively small change in priors would be
negligible.
Discussion
Previously, we have reported that observers’ responses
in an auditory-visual spatial localization task is remark-
ably consistent with a Bayesian observer performing
causal inference (Ko¨rding et al., 2007). Here, we show
that drastically changing the stimuli has no statistically
significant effect on the estimated prior probabilities. We
found that using the priors estimated from a data set based
on substantially different stimuli results in an excellent
and equally good fit to the data as those estimated from
the same data set. A direct comparison of the estimated
parameters for the two conditions also confirmed that,
while the likelihood function associated with the stimulus
that was drastically changed is substantially affected by
the change, the prior parameters remained fairly
unchanged. Even if we had not changed the stimuli, i.e.,
if the two sessions were identical, the fact that the
estimated priors are the same in two occasions that are
one week apart, is note-worthy, as it suggests that priors
are stable across time. Altogether, these results suggest
that the priors are indeed independent of the stimuli and
reflect a priori knowledge, and that the priors and
likelihoods are represented independently in the nervous
system and are combined according to Bayes rule in this
perceptual task.
Recently, there has been much discussion of whether
human behavior is Bayes-optimal (Rao, Olshausen, &
Lewicki, 2002). For the behavior to be Bayes-optimal, the
priors utilized in the inference process do not necessarily
need to mirror the statistics of the environment. Even
when the priors are stable, and independent of likelihoods,
they may not reflect the true statistics of the environment
if for some reason the observer has a wrong model of the
world, or is constrained by other factors. Such an
inference is nonetheless subjectively optimal even when
the prior does not reflect the true statistics of the
environment and is thus not objectively optimal. Here,
we assumed that the observers have a prior bias for the
center (straight ahead) location, and found that indeed this
prior fits the data well and is stable across sensory
conditions. If it is indeed true that most events fall in the
straight-ahead location due to orienting behavior (observ-
ers quickly orient towards the events by an eye and head
movement), then this prior could be considered objec-
tively optimal. On the other hand, if this is not the case,
and most auditory-visual events do not fall in the center of
the auditory/visual field most of the time, then, this
inference would only be subjectively optimal. Such a
prior might be due to evolutionary or biological con-
straints (i.e. ‘hard-wired’); however, if the prior is
modifiable by experience, then it is expected to reflect
the true statistics of the environment as has been shown
for the ‘light-from-above’ prior (Adams, Graf, & Ernst,
2004; Mamassian & Landy, 2001).
As we have shown, the framework of Bayesian
inference provides experimenters with a principled
approach to examining the role and nature of perceptual
biases through evaluating Bayesian priors. Some work has
already been done in this direction (e.g. Stocker &
Simoncelli, 2006; Weiss, Simoncelli, & Adelson, 2002).
Quantitatively estimating priors allows probing perceptual
biases more concisely than previously possible by making
it possible to explore the origins of these biases, whether
the biases are stable across different conditions and
observers, and whether these biases can be modified by
experience, context, or other factors.
It is also worth mentioning the difference among the
various types of perceptual priors so far studied in the
literature. Stocker and Simoncelli (2006) presented sub-
jects with moving stimuli under different visual contrasts
and were able to estimate a prior on visual velocities. In
contrast here we have studied a prior that is composed of
two components, one over spatial location, p(s), (the
counterpart of the prior on velocities in Stocker and
Simoncelli’s study), as well as a component, pC, that
encapsulates the expected probability of two auditory and
visual sources being the same, and hence specifies the
degree of interaction between two modalities, similar to
Bresciani et al. (2006) and Shams et al. (2005). Although
the prior was constant across conditions in this study, it is
expected that it would vary for different tasks and
different modalities. While the a priori expectation of a
common cause is expected to be mostly due to the learned
or hard-wired statistics of the auditory-visual events in the
environment, it may also be affected by the instructions
provided to the observer by the experimenter or the
context of the experiment (Ernst, 2007). It seems highly
likely that some of the differences in the crossmodal
interactions reported by different studies are due to
differences in the prior expectation of the common cause,
pC (see Hospedales & Vijayakumar, 2009 for a recent
analysis).
These findings, together with many other recent findings
(Alais & Burr, 2004; Battaglia et al., 2003; Bu¨lthoff &
Mallot, 1988; Ernst & Banks, 2002; Jacobs, 1999;
Ko¨rding et al., 2007; Ko¨rding & Tenenbaum, 2007;
Shams et al., 2005; Stocker & Simoncelli, 2006; van
Beers et al., 1999), provide accumulating evidence that
the nervous system utilizes Bayesian inference. However,
they do not describe how the probability distributions and
operations required for this computation are implemented
in the brain. Recent work on this question has led to
promising results, e.g. Ma, Beck, Latham, and Pouget
(2006) have shown how in theory the multiplication of
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likelihood and prior is a natural outcome of population
coding with biologically realistic neurons and Poisson
distributed firing rates.
Conclusions
We have shown that the priors in an audio-visual
localization task are independent of likelihoods and are
thus encoded separately. This finding is consistent with
the general notion that the nervous system combines
sensory estimates with the prior knowledge about the
environment for perceptual processing.
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